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ABSTRACT
This paper empirically investigates the performance of Chinese initial public offerings (IPOs).
The data used covers the period from mid-1995 to mid-1999 with the sample including 884
companies (both in the A- and B-share markets).  In an examination of growth, profitability and
stability of listed companies either individually or as a combination, it can be seen that the only
industries in which listed companies in China display strong performance are public utilities,
transportation and finance.
If one examines the changes in listed companies’ financial indicators following the IPO, it
becomes apparent that with the exception of earnings related indicators (EPS and ROE) there are
no significant changes. What’s more, the financial indicators tend to fall rapidly year on year.  This
means that the IPO is of little obvious help to companies’ operational performance, and may actually
make things worse.  One of the reasons for this is that in order to implement the IPO and secure
stock market listing, companies tend to submit inflated figures in the financial statements that they
are required to provide.  Another possible factor is the poor corporate governance characteristics of
Chinese enterprises.
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1.  Introduction 
During a period of institutional transformation, since informal constraints such as culture, 
rules and values are difficult to change once formed, if the transformation takes the form 
of the development of an inefficient system, they could become an obstacle to 
institutional transformation, locking the institution into the original path of evolution.  
Other institutions displaying better performance would consequently be unable to emerge 
(North, 1991, 1994). An efficient institution can be beneficial to institutional 
transformation and the spontaneous evolution of society (Hayek, 1960). 
  In the process of institutional transformation, whereby China has moved gradually 
away from a centrally-planned economy towards a market economy, the emphasis has 
been on the establishment of a sound system of property rights and a stable financial 
system; the reform of the financial system has attracted the most attention. The financial 
system is closely bound up with the reform of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and of the 
fiscal system; thus the reform of the financial system will have a significant impact on 
the institutional transformation of China’s economy as a whole. The establishment of the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange in December 1990 was a landmark in the development of the 
stock market in China. As the necessary infrastructure was established, the calls for a 
direct financing market g rew louder. The stock market began to blossom, and there was 
rapid development within a relatively short space of time. 
  The types of shares traded in China’s stock market can be divided into three main 
categories: A-, B- and H-shares. A-shares are available to domestic holders, B-shares are 
available exclusively to foreign investors and certain authorized domestic securities 
firms, and H-shares are listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange.
1
 Since 1987, A-shares 
have steadily become more popular; as at December  2000, the total amount raised 
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  From 20 February 2001, B-shares were made available to domestic residents.  
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through the issuing of new shares and allotment shares came to  Renminbi ( RMB) 
324.213 billion. As regards B -shares, since they were first issued in 1992, they have 
become one of the main means by which China secures its foreign investment.  
However, the amount of money raised through B-shares has been less than the amount 
raised from A-, H- or N-shares (N-shares are listed on the New York Stock Exchange). 
  H-shares were first issued in 1993 as another means by which the stock markets 
could secure foreign capital.  By 2000, the total amount of funds secured by the issuing 




  Several  recent  empirical studies  have  provide d evidence o f the performance of 
initial public offerings (IPOs) for China’s stock markets, for example Mok and Hui (1998) 
found  that  A-share IPOs in Shanghai  were 289% underpriced between  19 December 
1990 and  31 December 1993, due to the excessive  demand for the limited supply of 
negotiable shares. B -share IPOs  were only 26% underpriced. Different ownership 
structures, a long time-lag between offering and listing, and information asymmetry all 
contributed to IPO under  pricing. Using data o n 308 firm-commitment IPOs from 1 
January  1987 through  to 31 December 1995, Su and Fleisher (1999) f ound IPO 
underpricing was a strategy for firms to signal their value to investors. From a sample of 
83 IPOs completed between 1992 and 1995, Aharony et al. (2000) found that the median 
firm return on assets (ROA) peaked in the IPO year and declined thereafter. The 
post-IPO decline in ROA is statistically insignificant in protected industries such as 
petrochemicals, energy and raw materials; firms in the protected industries are favored 
by the Chinese government in the selection process. Chen et al. (2000) considered  277 
A-share and 65 B-share IPOs during  the 1992-1995 period, with their results showing 
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  Xu (2000) indicates there is no significant evidence of  any causal relationship between volume and 
volatility for Shanghai B-shares.    Sun and Tong (2000) also find foreign investors are more sensitive to 
currency risk.  
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that B-share IPOs underperformed A-share IPOs during the post-issue periods for up to 
three years. 
  In this paper, we extend the prior works on Chinese IPOs and empirically examine 
the IPO performance. Our sample consists of 437 companies listed on the Shanghai stock 
exchange, and 447 companies listed on the Shenzhen exchange, for a longer time period, 
from 1995 to 1999. Investigation of China’s IPOs is appealing and timely, since most of 
the listed companies are SOEs, and establishing effective corporate governance of SOEs 
has become a key priority for China’s policy makers during the transitional period. 
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a discussion 
on equity structure and  the corporate governance mechanism. Section 3 establishes 
financial indicators to evaluate the operational performance of listed companies. The 
empirical results of IPOs performance are reported in Section 4, with Section 5 providing 
concluding remarks to this study. 
2.  Equity Structure and Corporate Governance 
The methods by which stocks are listed and shares issued in China’s stock markets 
violate the market principle. Equity in listed companies is artificially divided into 
different categories of shares in the same stock that have different rights - state shares, 
legal person shares, public shares and internal employee shares. State shares are held by 
the state and its varied ministries, bureaus and regional governments, legal personal 
shares are  kept by other  SOEs, public shares are  retained by individuals or private 
entities, and internal employee shares are  maintained by managers and employees.  For 
example, holders of state shares can transfer their allotment rights in part or in whole to 
the holders of public shares, whilst holders of state shares can maintain their right to 
share in the benefits from share allotment, or choose not to participate in share allotment, 
thereby transferring the risk onto the shoulders of the holders of public shares. By  
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contrast, the holders of public shares can only buy and sell shares on the secondary 
market.   
  Table 1 provides details of the equity structure of listed companies in China and the 
changes to that structure. During the period from the end of 1992 to the end of 2000, the 
equity structure of listed companies was as follows: 
 
Table 1  Equity structure of stocks listed on China’s stock markets 
 
end 1992  end 1997  end 1998  end 1999  end 2000 
Share Type  billion 
shares  % 
billion 
shares  % 
billion 
shares  % 
billion 
shares  % 
billion 
shares  % 
  I.  Shares not yet in   
    circulation 
4.769  69.25  127.124  65.44  166.485  65.89  200.71  65.02  243.743  64.28 
    1. Founder’s stock  4.035  58.59  107.826  55.50  142.934  56.57  174.709  56.60  216.54  57.11 
      a. State shares  2.850  41.38  61.228  31.52  86.551  34.25  111.607  36.16  147.513  38.90 
      b. Domestic legal   
        person shares  0.905  13.14  43.991  22.64  52.806  20.90  59.051  19.13  64.255  16.94 
      c. Foreign legal   
        person shares 
0.280  4.07  2.607  1.34  3.577  1.42  4.051  1.31  4.62  1.22 
    2. Fund-raising legal   
      person shares  0.649  9.42  13.049  6.72  15.234  6.03  19.01  6.16  21.421  5.65 
    3. Internal employee    
      shares 
0.085  1.23  3.962  2.04  5.170  2.05  3.671  1.19  2.429  0.64 
    4. Other (transferred   
      allotment)  0.00  0.00  2.287  1.18  3.147  1.25  3.32  1.08  2.462  0.65 
 II. Shares in circulation  2.118  30.75  67.144  34.56  86.194  34.11  107.965  34.98  135.427  35.72 
    1. Domestically listed   
      Renminbi shares (A-   
      shares) 
1.093  15.87  44.268  22.79  60.803  24.06  81.318  26.34  107.817  28.44 
    2. Domestically-listed   
      foreign capital shares  
      (B-shares) 
1.025  14.88  11.731  6.04  13.396  5.30  14.192  4.60  15.157  4.00 
    3. Overseas-listed   
      foreign capital shares  
      (H-shares) 
0.00  0.00  11.145  5.74  11.995  4.75  12.454  4.03  12.454  3.28 
 
Note:  Each share has a face value of RMB1.00.   
 
Sources:  China Securities and Futures Statistical Yearbook 2000,p.189. 
  China Securities Regulatory Commission Website. 
 
State shares remained the dominant proportion of total shares, but the proportion of 
state shares in the equity structure of listed c ompanies fell from 41.38% to 38.9%, a 
decrease of 2.48%. The reasons for this decline were as follows: (i) owing to the fall in 
central government revenue, China stopped increasing the capitalization of SOEs; 
however, listed companies were constantly implementing capital increments to increase  
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the proportion of public shares, which therefore caused the proportion of state shares to 
fall; and (ii) in the last few years there has been a series of cases of state shares being 
privately transferred to legal persons, which has increased the proportion of legal person 
shares.  
The reform of SOEs is nevertheless still making use mainly of state-owned holding 
companies, with the government insisting that listed companies must still be subsidiaries 
of a state-owned holding company. The reform of the SOEs therefore does not involve 
wholesale privatization, and state shares therefore continue to play an important role.   
As far as founders’ stocks are concerned, the proportion of domestic legal person 
shares has risen fro m 13.14% to 16.94%, an increase of  3.8%, whilst the proportion of 
fund-raising legal person shares has fallen from 9.42% to  5.65%, a decrease of 3.77%. 
The reasons for this are as follows: (i) most listed companies have been transformed 
from SOEs; listing is usually implemented as part of the restructuring of SOEs, and the 
proportion of total capitalization accounted for by the former SOE’s internal reserves is 
defined as founder’s stock after listing; (ii) many listed companies are the profitable parts 
of SOEs which were spun off, with the SOEs retaining founder’s stock; this has led to a 
significant increase in the proportion of founder’s stock; and (iii) owing to the general 
decline in enterprise performance over the last few years, and the restrictions o n the 
circulation of legal person shares, the market for legal person shares is not sufficiently 
lively and market prices are unattractively low; as a result, there has been a general 
decrease in mutual investment between unrelated legal persons, so that the proportion of 
fund-raising legal person shares has gradually fallen.   
The proportion of employee shares in unlisted companies rose from 1.23% to 2.04% , 
and then declined to 0.64%. This reflects the way in which, during the process of 
institutional transformation, enterprises have used employee stock options as a means of 
improving employee welfare.  
  8 
  With regard to the proportion of total equity accounted for by the various types of 
shares, the continual implementation of capital increments to increase t he number of 
public shares and the private transfer of state shares to legal persons has caused the 
proportion of listed company equity accounted for by state shares to fall from 41.38% in 
1992, to 38.9% in  2000. State shares are, however, still the most numerous categories of 
shares. At the same time, because shares that cannot be traded freely (including state 
shares) account for 60% of total equity, company managers do not have to worry that 
poor management may cause their enterprise’s stock price to fall, or that their company 
will be faced with the threat of being taken over. In other words, holders of public shares 
cannot ‘vote with their feet’ and managers are not concerned about the rights of public 
shareholders (Xu and Wang, 1999). 





 rail transport and electric power sectors, seeking to 
reorganize the entire industry and establish a regulated company system. The aim was to 
have these reorganized companies listed on the domestic and overseas stock markets, 
establishing a regulated framework for corporate governance and turning the old SOEs 
into real businesses. 
  The developing capital markets can, on the one hand, enable enterprises to increase 
their capitalization, whilst at the same time the change in enterprises’ equity and 
corporate governance structures can be used to create a solid foundation for dealing with 
the underlying causes of indebtedness. However, China’s capital markets have not had 
long to develop, and their overall level of development is still low. Too little in-depth 
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  China Petroleum and Natural Gas Ltd. implemented an initial public offering using H-Shares and ADR 
in both Hong Kong and New York in March 2000, after which the state shares in the company held by its 
parent company, CNPC, was reduced to 90% (Wu, 2001). 
4
  In June 2000, following reorganization, Zhong Lian Tung secured stock market listing in both Hong 
Kong and New York using ‘Red Chip’ shares and ADR. The amount of capital raised was US$6.278 billion, 
making this the largest IPO ever involving an Asian company (other than Japanese companies). Following 
the IPO, the shares in Zhong Lian Tung held by the state fell by 80% (Wu, 2001).  
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thinking has gone into directing the course of their development and various levels of 
disparity exist in certain areas. Furthermore, theoretically speaking, the co rporate 
governance structure requires a separation between investors and managers; a set of 
incentive mechanisms and restrictive mechanisms need to be developed to reduce agency 
costs and ensure that the investors receive a return on their investment. However, there 
are inherent weaknesses in the governance structure of China’s SOEs. First of all, as far 
as incentive mechanisms are concerned, despite 20 years of reform, there has been no 
systematic improvement in the incentive mechanisms of China’s SOEs and their attempts 
to imitate the incentive mechanisms of private enterprises have run into two major 
problems. First of all, it is very difficult to find suitable indicators for implementing 
rewards and punishments in SOEs, wherein both the starting point and the policy burden 
are different; and secondly, there is a lack of faith in the commitments made. The SOEs’ 
restrictive mechanisms are characterized by excessive administrative interference and the 
simultaneous existence of excessive internal controls.
5
 A s a result, enterprise 
management tends to become divorced from the owners’ interest. It is therefore not 
enough to rely on the capital markets alone to transform the SOEs; a strategic withdrawal 
is needed from state involvement in the economy, and a favorable environment for 
privatization has to be created. This is the only way in which the reform of the SOEs can 
really be facilitated (Wu and Zhao, 2000). 
3.  The Operational Performance of Listed Companies 
We will explore the operational performance of listed companies in China in terms of the 
growth, profitability and  stability of these companies, taking into consideration 
differences between stock exchanges and industries. The selection of financial indicators 
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  One example is Zhonguo Yituo Ltd. in Henan Province. Although Zhonguo Yituo succeeded in securing 
RMB 1.6 billion through the stock market in 1997, the lack of sound management mechanisms led to 
errors being made with respect to the company’s expansion, and consequently, the company’s operational 
performance was poor.  
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is based on: (i) the use of listed companies’ operating revenue and net profit growth rates 
to explore the performance of listed companies in terms of growth, as well as the 
differences between  stock exchanges and industries; (ii) the use of listed companies’ 
earnings per share (EPS) and return on equity (ROE) (net profit/shareholders’ equity) to 
explore listed companies’ performance in terms of profitability, as well as the differences 
between  stock exchanges and industries; and (iii) the use of listed companies’ quick 
ratios ( [current asset – inventory] /current ratio) and current ratio (current asset/current 
liability) to explore listed companies’ performance in terms of stability, as well as the 
differences between  stock exchanges and industries. Empirical verification was then 
undertaken with regard to the impact of IPOs on the operational performance of listed 
companies, to determine the impact of the stock market on China’s economic 
development as it progresses through this period of institutional transformation. 
Data description and methodology  
Listed companies’ interim financial reports for 1999  published by China Securities 
Regulatory Commission (CSRC)  were used for empirical estimation, the data given 
covered the period from mid-1995 to mid-1999. CSRC data include listed companies’ 
operating revenue, net profit rates, earnings per share (EPS), return on equity (ROE), 
quick ratio and current ratio. The sample included 884 companies (including both 
A-Shares and B-Shares); 437 of the companies were listed on the Shanghai Stock Market, 
and 447 were listed on the Shenzhen Stock Market. 
  As regards industry classification, the Shanghai Stock Market divides all listed 
companies into five categories – industrial, commercial, real estate, public utilities and 
general. The Shenzhen Stock Market divides all listed companies into six categories – 
industrial, commercial, financial, real estate, public utilities and general. Such a 
classification is inappropriate,  partly because the two stock exchanges use different  
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classification systems, and partly because the classification is not sufficiently precise.  
If the industry data produced by the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets is used, not 
only is the classification too precise, the disparity between the  numbers of enterprises in 
each category is too  obvious. To facilitate comparison, for the purposes of this study all 
listed companies were divided into 21 industries: agriculture; mining; food; textiles and 
garments; printing and papermaking; metals and metal products; chemicals; 
pharmaceuticals; construction materials; machinery; electronics and electrical appliances; 
precision instruments; vehicles; miscellaneous; public utilities; transportation; finance; 
real estate and construction; travel and hotels; commercial; trade; and information (see 
Table 2). 
 
Table 2  Sample data industry categories 
 
Industry Category  Original Category  Industry Category  Original Category 
Agriculture  Commerce 
Forestry  Rental 








Machinery  Foreign trade  Trade 
Milling machines & materials  Food 
Machinery 
Textile machinery  Textiles 
Electromechanical 
Food, textiles & 
garments 
Garments 
Electronic appliances  Printing 
Wire and cable 
Printing and 
papermaking  Paper industry 




Home appliances  Artificial fiber 
Instruments and meters 
Chemical industry 
Paints  Precision 
instruments  Medical instruments  Glass 





Auto accessories  Materials 
Auto manufacturing  Ceramics 
Shipbuilding  Basic construction 
Vehicles 
Aircraft manufacturing  Highway construction 
Iron and steel 
Real estate and 
construction 
Harbor construction  Metals and metal 
products  Metallurgy  Industrial districts 
Pharmaceuticals  Real estate  Pharmaceuticals  Biotechnology  Building contractors 
Pens  Public utilities 




Sports  Warehousing 
Miscellaneous 




Hotels  Travel and hotels 
Brewing  Finance  Finance 
  
  12 
  The data covers the period 1995 – 1999, during which both the Asian financial crisis 
and China’s economic recovery have occurred; it is therefore inappropriate to compare 
the data for different years. In addition, as regards the comparison of financial indicators 
between listed companies, as a reasonable level of comprehension has already been 
achieved with respect to listed companies’ financial statements, the main emphasis in the 
following analysis will be on the comparison of industry performance in each year and 
on industry performance within the sample as a whole. 
  The industries to which listed companies belong are then grouped into five 
categories: (i) those industries which have performed very well by comparison with the 
average for all industries (e.g., the financial indicator for the industry in question was 
50% higher than the average for all industries for that year or period); (ii) those 
industries which performed better than the average for all industries (e.g., the financial 
indicator for the industry in question was higher than, but less than 50% higher than, the 
average for all industries for that year or period); (iii) those industries which performed 
worse than the average for all industries (e.g., the financial indicator for the industry in 
question was lower than, but less than 50% lower than, the average for all industries for 
that year or period); (iv) those industries which performed significantly worse than the 
average for all industries (e.g., the financial indicator for the industry in question was 
less than 0.5% of the average for all industries for that year or period); (v) those 
industries which performed markedly worse than the average for all industries (e.g., the 
financial indicator for the industry in question was less than 0.1% of the average for all 
industries for that year or period). 
To assess the pre- and post-IPO operational performance of listed companies, 
according to Greene (1993), the analysis of variance (ANOVA) tests the null hypothesis 
that all coefficients of the regression other than the intercept are zero; the ANOVA test 
rather than regression method can be used to conduct empirical assessment. Therefore,  
  13 
the ANOVA method was  utilized  to verify the impact of the IPO on the operational 
performance of listed companies, to determine whether the null hypothesis could be 
accepted  – the null hypothesis was that a listed company’s operational performance 
would not change after initial public offering, namely, there would be no difference to 
the  financial indicators between the average values of the IPO year and the average 
values of the subsequent three years. 
  We will begin by analyzing the overall operational performance of the industries to 
which China’s listed companies belong, from the points of view of growth, profitability 
and  stability. First, we will conduct combined analysis of operating revenue and 
profitability by industry. We will then calculate the overall financial indicator ratings for 
each  stock exchange and each industry, in order to evaluate the overall relative 
operational performance of listed companies in China. 
  Regarding the analysis of overall industry operating revenue and profitability, the 
financial indicators which can best represent a listed company’s operating revenue and 
profitability are the operating revenue growth rate and return on equity (ROE) (Li, 1999). 
The industry’s growth rate in operating revenue is taken as the horizontal axis, with 
return on equity (ROE) as the vertical axis, and the relevant values from the Shanghai 
and Shenzhen stock exchanges are then plotted on the graph. The average value for all 
companies listed on the two exchanges is taken as the demarcation point, and all 
industries divided into four categories; (1) industries with high growth and high profits 
(the first quadrant on the graph); (2) industries with low growth but high profits (the 
second quadrant); (3) industries with low growth but low profits (the third quadrant); and 
(4) industries with  high growth and low profits (the fourth quadrant).  Those industries 
with high growth and high profits have the highest overall revenue and profitability; 
those industries with low growth and low profits have the lowest overall revenue and 
profitability; those industries with high growth and low profits or low growth and high  
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profits lie between the two (see Figures 1 and 2). 
(1)  Industries with high growth and high profitability 
This category includes public utilities and trade. Their chief characteristics are that they 
have a large potential market and good development potential. 
(2)  Industries with low growth and high profitability 
This category includes transportation, pharmaceuticals, agriculture and mining. These 
industries have stable market prices, and while they do experience temporary slumps, 
overall they are stable, mature industries with high profitability.   
(3)  Industries with high growth and low profitability 
On the Shanghai Stock Exchange, this category includes a total of six industries: 
precision instruments; information; electronics and electrical appliances; the chemical 
industry; commerce and miscellaneous. On the Shenzhen Stock Exchange it includes a 
total of five industries: food; textiles and garments; pharmaceuticals; printing and 
papermaking; machinery and information. The chief characteristic of these industries is 
that competition is very fierce within each industry. Although overall demand is still 
increasing, the rate of increase in supply is far higher than the rate of increase in demand.  
As a result, price-cutting competition is causing earnings to fall, and there is market 
polarization in the performance of companies in the industry. However, the prospects for 
the industry as a whole are still good, and there is considerable potential for development 
in the medium and long term.  
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  Figure 1  Distribution of ROE and operating revenue growth rate for companies listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange, by industry  
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Figure 2  Distribution of ROE and operating revenue growth rate for companies listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, by industry  
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  (4) Industries with low growth and low profits 
On the Shanghai Stock Exchange this category includes a total of nine industries: real 
estate and construction; travel and hotels; construction materials; metals and metal 
products; finance; vehicles; machinery; food; textiles and garments; and printing and 
papermaking. On the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, it includes a total of 14 industries: 
real estate and construction; travel and hotels; construction materials; metals and metal 
products; finance; vehicles; electronics and electrical appliances; the chemical industry; 
commerce; miscellaneous; agriculture; precision instruments; trade; and transportation. 
The main characteristic of these industries is that many of them are primary industries.  
In recent years, the price of raw materials and energy in China has risen, but the price 
of finished products has fallen. As a result, the market has contracted, competition has 
become much fiercer, and overall industry performance has fallen. 
  Finally, we will calculate the overall financial indicator scores for each stock 
exchange and each industry in order to evaluate the overall relative operational 
performance of listed companies in China. The standard for evaluation will be based 
on the principles of analysis described above. Those industries displaying good 
performance a re awarded five points, those displaying acceptable performance are 
awarded four points, those displaying relatively poor performance are awarded three 
points, those displaying bad performance are awarded two points, and those displaying 
very bad performance are awarded just one point. 
  The only industries to display good overall performance (with a total score of four 
or higher) were the public utilities, transportation and finance industries. In terms of 
stock exchange, for the Shanghai Stock Exchange those industries which displayed 
relatively good performance were the public utilities, chemical, trade and precision 
instruments industries; for the Shenzhen Stock Exchange they were the transportation  
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and finance industries. Clearly, the overall operational  performance of most industries 
is poor, and those that demonstrate better performance are China’s ‘sunrise’ industries.   
Furthermore, of the companies listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange, the overall 
performance of those in the agriculture, food, textiles and garments, metals and metal 
products, chemical, pharmaceuticals, precision instruments, miscellaneous, public 
utilities, real estate, commerce, trade and information industries was superior to that of 
those listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (see Tables 3 – 5). 
 
Table 3  Overall financial indicator ratings, listed companies in China 
 









Agriculture  3  3  3  3  4  4  3.33 
Mining  2  3  5  4  4  3  3.50 
Food, textiles and garments  2  3  3  3  4  4  3.17 
Printing and papermaking  2  3  3  3  4  4  3.17 
Metals and metal products  5  4  3  3  3  3  3.50 
Chemical industry  4  4  3  3  4  4  3.67 
Pharmaceuticals  3  3  3  3  4  3  3.17 
Construction materials  2  3  3  3  3  3  2.83 
Machinery  3  3  3  3  3  4  3.17 
Electronics and electrical appliances  5  5  3  4  3  3  3.83 
Precision instruments  2  4  3  5  4  4  3.67 
Vehicles  5  3  2  3  3  3  3.17 
Miscellaneous  2  3  4  4  4  4  3.50 
Public utilities  3  5  4  4  4  4  4.00 
Transportation  4  3  4  4  5  5  4.17 
Finance  4  5  4  5  3  3  4.00 
Real estate and construction  3  4  3  3  3  3  3.17 
Travel and hotels  3  4  3  4  4  4  3.67 
Commerce  3  3  5  3  3  3  3.33 
Trade  5  3  3  4  4  4  3.83 
Information  3  4  2  4  4  4  3.50 
 
Note:  Those industries displaying superior performance are given five points, those displaying reasonable 
performance are given four points, those displaying relatively poor performance are given three points, those 
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Table 4  Overall financial indicator ratings, companies listed on the Shanghai stock exchange 
 









Agriculture  3  4  4  4  4  4  3.83 
Mining  2  3  4  3  3  3  3.00 
Food, textiles and garments  2  3  4  4  4  4  3.50 
Printing and papermaking  2  3  3  3  3  3  2.83 
Metals and metal products  5  4  3  3  3  3  3.50 
Chemical industry  5  5  4  3  4  4  4.17 
Pharmaceuticals  3  3  4  4  3  3  3.33 
Construction materials  2  2  3  2  3  3  2.50 
Machinery  3  3  3  3  3  4  3.17 
Electronics and electrical appliances  4  4  3  4  3  3  3.50 
Precision instruments  3  3  4  4  5  5  4.00 
Vehicles  4  3  2  3  3  3  3.00 
Miscellaneous  2  3  4  4  4  4  3.50 
Public utilities  3  5  5  4  4  4  4.17 
Transportation  3  3  5  4  4  4  3.83 
Finance  2  5  4  5  3  3  3.67 
Real estate and construction  3  4  4  4  3  3  3.50 
Travel and hotels  2  3  3  3  4  4  3.17 
Commerce  3  3  4  4  3  3  3.33 
Trade  5  4  4  5  4  4  4.33 
Information  3  4  4  4  3  3  3.50 
 
Note:  See Table 3. 
 
Table 5  Overall financial indicator ratings, companies listed on the Shenzhen stock exchange 
 









Agriculture  3  2  2  3  4  4  3.00 
Mining  2  3  5  4  5  4  3.83 
Food, textiles and garments  2  2  2  2  3  3  2.33 
Printing and papermaking  3  3  2  3  4  4  3.17 
Metals and metal products  5  4  2  3  3  3  3.33 
Chemical industry  4  3  3  3  3  3  3.17 
Pharmaceuticals  3  2  2  3  4  4  3.00 
Construction materials  3  3  3  4  4  4  3.50 
Machinery  4  3  3  4  3  4  3.50 
Electronics and electrical appliances  5  5  3  4  3  3  3.83 
Precision instruments  2  4  2  5  4  4  3.50 
Vehicles  5  4  2  3  3  3  3.33 
Miscellaneous  2  3  4  5  3  3  3.33 
Public utilities  3  5  3  4  4  4  3.83 
Transportation  4  4  3  4  5  5  4.17 
Finance  5  5  4  4  3  3  4.00 
Real estate and construction  3  4  2  3  3  3  3.00 
Travel and hotels  3  5  3  4  4  4  3.83 
Commerce  3  2  5  3  3  3  3.17 
Trade  3  2  2  2  3  3  2.50 
Information  3  4  1  4  4  4  3.33 
 
Note:  See Table 3 
4.  The Impact of IPO on Listed Companies 
In the previous section, we undertook structural analysis of the financial indicators of 
listed companies in China. However, more analysis is needed to determine whether an  
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IPO does in fact have a positive impact on a company’s operations.
6
 In this study, we 
use the ANOVA method, which is applied to the data for the year of IPO and the 
subsequent three years, to undertake m ean value parity assumption verification 
analysis with respect to companies’ operating revenue growth rate, net profit growth 
rate, EPS and ROE.  The results are shown in Table 6.  The results of the ANOVA 
analysis show that following  initial public offering, the only financial indicators in 
which there is any statistical ly significant change are  ROE and EPS (for companies 
listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange only); in other words, it is only in the 
profitability indicators where there is any change. 
Table 6  Empirical results of ANOVA by stock exchanges 
   
Shanghai  Shenzhen  Financial Indicator 
F value  Pr > F value  F value  Pr > F value 
Operating revenue growth rate  0.16  0.926  0.86  0.46 
Net profit growth rate  0.16  0.926  1.07  0.3602 
EPS  8.1    0.0001*  1.15  0.334 
ROE  9.12    0.0001*  10.55    0.0001* 
 
Note: * Indicates significance at 1% level. 
 
  We further classify the industry into six sub-categories: agriculture, manufacturing, 
public utilities, real estate and construction, finance and commerce, and general. The 
results of ANOVA in Table 7 indicate that following initial public offering, the 
financial indicators in which there are statistically significant changes are ROE for 
manufacturing and finance and commerce, since they are state monopolies. If the liste d 
companies are grouped by share classes, the results of ANOVA in Table 8 indicate that 




                                                   
6
 According to Chinese Company Law, the stock shares of listed companies shall not be less than 5,000 
shares. If they reach 5,000 shares, there i s no need to issue new shares; therefore, dilution effect by IPOs 
does not exist. Otherwise, if there were less than 5,000 shares, dilution effect may be pervasive.  
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Table 7  Empirical results of ANOVA by industry 
 





Financial Indicator  F  Pr > F  F  F  Pr > F  F  Pr > F  Pr > F  F  Pr > F  F  Pr > F 
Operating revenue 
growth rate 
3.34  0.048  1.26  0.286  0.43  0.732  0.51  0.677  0.236  0.878  0.06  0.981 
Net profit growth 
rate 
0.75  0.48  0.5  0.657  1.28  0.297  0.91  0.442  0.79  0.502  0.41  0.743 
EPS  1.51  0.229  0.82  0.485  1.79  0.162  4.01  0.011  1.5  0.215  2.83  0.042 
ROE  1.24  0.31  10.59  0.0001
*  0.78  0.511  3.64  0.017  5.47  0.001
*  0.07  0.977 
 
Notes: 1  * Indicates that the null hypothesis is rejected within a 1% level of significance 
2  Agriculture includes Agriculture, Forestry, Fisheries,  and Livestock sectors; Manufacture  includes 
Mining, Food, Textiles and garments,  Printing and papermaking ,  Chemical industry, Pharmaceuticals, 
Construction materials, Machinery, Electronics and electrical appliances,  Precision instruments,  Vehicles, 
Metals and metal products, Information, and Miscellaneous sectors; General includes Transportation, Travel 
and hotels, and Foreign trade sectors. 
 
Table 8  Empirical results of ANOVA by share classes 
 
A-share  B-share  Financial Indicator 
F  Pr > F  F  Pr > F 
Operating revenue growth rate  0.83  0.478  0.53  0.595 
Net profit growth rate  1.55  0.2  0.61  0.552 
EPS  2.49  0.059  3.2  0.034 
ROE  15.93  0.001*  6.83  0.001* 
 
Note: * indicates that the null hypothesis is rejected within a 1% level of significance 
 
  If the financial indicators for listed companies before and after IPO are grouped in 
sets of two years, regardless of whether the company is listed on the Shanghai or 
Shenzhen stock exchanges, we can then see from these  results that: (i) operating 
revenue growth rate tends to decline sharply after IPO with a clear disparity here with 
the annual statistics reported at the time of IPO; (ii) net profit growth rate tends to 
decline sharply after IPO with a clear disparity here with the annual statistics reported 
at the time of IPO; (iii) return on equity tends to fall sharply after IPO with a clear 
disparity here with the financial statements submitted at the time of  IPO; and (iv) 
earnings per share tend to fall sharply after IPO; in the case of companies listed on the 
Shanghai stock exchange, there was a clear disparity with the financial statements 
submitted at the time of  IPO, whilst for companies listed on the Shenzhen stock 
exchange this was not the case, and some improvement could be seen in the tendency  
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for earnings per share to fall. 
  The above analysis shows that for enterprises in China’s stock markets, IPO does 
not present any marked benefits with respect to their operational performance, and in 
fact performance tends to worsen. One of the reasons for this is that in order to 
implement the initial public offering and secure stock market listing, companies tend to 
submit inflated figures in the financial statements that they are required to provide; the 
real situation is gradually reflected after the company has secured listing. In addition, 
the state still retains a majority shareholding in most listed SOEs in China, thus, the 
fundamental character of these enterprises is unchanged and the influence of the 
original SOEs systems and structures has not been erased. In particular, the 
government still directly appoints, or interferes in the appointment of senior managers 
for some companies; a company chairman or president is frequently appointed by 
government authorities. In their governance structure, therefore, many listed 
companies retain an agency relationship within the company, rather than a property 
ownership relationship. At best, governance in these companies is a mixture of political 
interest and economic interest. What’s more, the control which holders of ‘state shares’ 
exercise over the company tends to be weak in economic terms but strong in political 
terms. As a result, in their role as ‘agents,’ the managers tend to  be opportunistic with 
respect to political matters, and to be affected by moral hazard with respect to 
economic matters. Using firm level data from over 300 stock companies from 1993 to 
1995, Xu and Wang (1999) found that there was a relationship between o wnership 
structure and corporate performance, indicating the positive role of legal person shares 
and the negative role of state shares. Chen (2001) used a sample of 434 manufacturing 
firms listed on the Chinese stock exchange; his findings showed that state shares play a 
negative role in corporate governance, whilst domestic institutional and managerial 
shareholdings improve firm’s performance.    
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Owing to the dual identity of the manager/agent, the mechanism for 
encouragement and sanction by the company’s m anagers cannot lead to the 
maximization of benefits for the company. There are further serious problems, such as 
the fact that internal control of company personnel is not kept within reasonable limits 
(Li and Huang, 1999). In other words, the inherent defects of the governance structure 
of Chinese companies lead to poor operational performance (He and Liu, 2000; Wu 
and Zhao, 2000). For example, it is unclear how much control the ownership of ‘state 
shares’ confers, there is too much insider trading, the responsibilities of the board of 
directors are not sufficiently defined, there is too much administrative interference, too 
many problems of internal control, and so on. As a result, although working capital 
may have increased after listing, there has been n o corresponding improvement in 
operational management. Consequently, the improvement in the company’s operational 
performance as a result of IPO is not that dramatic. Of course, operational performance 
is also affected by other factors not directly related to the company itself, such as the 
business cycle, the government’s industrial policy, and developments in related 
industries, that is to say, the fact that the Asian financial crisis and a weakening of 
demand in China occurred during the period covered by the sample is another reason 
for the sudden fall in the financial indicators. 
5.  Conclusions 
Whether one looks at growth, profitability and stability either individually or altogether, 
it can be seen that the only industries in China in which listed companies display 
strong performance are the public utilities, transportation and finance; that is to say, 
China’s ‘sunrise’ industries. The overall operational performance of all other industries 
is clearly unsatisfactory, and poor performance is particularly widespread with respect 
to growth. Owing to the weak demand within China, there is excessive supply,  
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intra-industry competition has become increasingly fierce and enterprises’ profit 
margins have been squeezed. In reality, the majority of enterprises in most industries 
have lost their ability to secure further financing, making it difficult for them to 
develop their operations further. In other words, listed companies have been willing to 
trade reduced profits for increased operating revenue and market share, which has 
affected their ability to secure financing. 
  An examination of the changes in listed companies’ financial indicators following 
IPO reveals that, with the exception of earnings related indicators (EPS  and ROE), 
there is no significant change. What’s more, the financial indicators tend to fall rapidly 
year on year. This means that  the IPO is of little obvious help to companies’ 
operational performance, and may actually make it worse. One of the reasons for this is 
that, in order to implement the initial public offering and secure stock market listing, 
companies tend to submit inflated figures in the financial statements they are required 
to provide; the real situation is only gradually reflected after the company has secured 
listing. Another possible factor is the poor corporate governance characteristics of 
Chinese enterprises. For example, it is unclear how much control the ownership of 
‘state shares’ confers, there is too much insider trading, the responsibilities of the board 
of directors are not sufficiently defined, there is too much administrative interference 
and too many problems of internal control. As a result, although working capital may 
increase after listing, there is no corresponding improvement in operational 
management. Consequently, the improvement in the company’s operational 
performance as a result of IPO is not that dramatic. Of course, another factor causing 
the financial indicators to fall rapidly is the fact that the Asian financial crisis and a 
falling off in domestic demand occurred during the period covered by the sample.   
  The quality of listed companies is a prerequisite and a foundation for the 
development of capital markets. Only when listed companies display strong  
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performance and growth can the ongoing development of the market be maintained. 
One of the things that needs to be done in order to improve the quality of listed 
companies is to select for listing those companies which display strong performance, 
have strong development potential and occupy a leading or adva ntageous position 
within their industry, encouraging hi-tech enterprises and companies in other emerging 
industries to make use of the capital markets. The second task is to ensure that the 
capital raised through IPO is used more efficiently; companies’ listing plans should be 
in conformity with their inventory and asset adjustment and their technology upgrading. 
Thirdly, listed companies need to thoroughly transform their management mechanisms, 
establishing an efficient corporate governance structure and corresponding stock option 
incentive mechanisms. Furthermore, the operations of listed companies need to be 
improved. Support can be provided for listed companies to improve their asset and 
liability structure through debt-for-equity swaps and refinancing,  and the Chinese 
government could encourage inter-regional, cross-industry mergers, acquisitions and 
asset reorganization between listed companies as well as between listed and non-listed 
companies, and between companies with different ownership structures. In this way, it 
will be possible to improve the operational efficiency of listed companies, cultivating a 
group of large listed companies with strong capabilities that will be competitive in 
international markets, making listed companies the core element  in the market and 
allowing them to exercise the function of market stabilization. 
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